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DETER~IIX~-\ TIOX OF RIGHTS TO
THE r~E OF \YATER OF BEAR
RIYER DH~-\JXAGE AREA IX RICH

COrXTY, ST_.--\TE OF rTAH.

t~ RAXDOLPH

L~-\.XD & LIVESTOCK
a corporation, DESERET
LIYESTOCK: C01IP ANY, a corporation,
BOrXTIFrL LIYESTOCIC COThfP AXY,
a corporation, HAROLD SEL:.Lc\.N, NICK
CHOl~RNOS, ORY~~ JOHKSON, and
CO~fPAXY,

\VILLIA~L

No. 7983

JOHXSO:K,

Objector and Appellants,
-vs.THE ITKITED STATES OF A~fERICA,J
Water Claimant and Respondent,
THE STATE ENGIXEER OF THEf-;TATE OF rTAH,
Respondent.

BRIEF OF

APPELL~TS

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The Supre1ne Court of the State of Utah granted an
appeal from an interlocutory decree entered on February
3
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7, 1953, in the District Court of Hid1 County, ....;tate of
Utah. By such interlocutory decree appealed from, the
district court overruled and dismissed the objection;-; filed
by appellants to the stockwatering "diligence right~··
claims, and also the stock watering claims based upon
applications to appropriate water filed by the Forest
Service and by the Bureau of Land _Management of the
United States of America, listed on pages 327, :l~\ 361
and 362 of the State Engineer's ''Proposed Determination of Water Rights in Bear River, Rich Countr, rtah,
Drainage Area." (Volume III, Record on Appeal).

1

The only rnatters in controversy here, relate to the
claims of water rights asserted by the r nited States of
America on behalf of the Forest Service and the Bureau
of Land Management. The rights of appellants and
others are not involved in this appeal. ConsPquently, notwithstanding the voluminous character of the State
Engineer's "Proposed Determination" (Volume Ill of
the Record on Appeal), only pages i, ii, 327, 3:2S, :;~D. 361
and 362 are matenal to this appeal. For the convenience
of the court, the essential items of pleading, the ~tipula
tion of facts and other rnatters which would eon;-;titute
an abstract of the record, are incorporated into the :--;tatPment of F'acts.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On July 13, l!J-!2, the respondent Stat<> ~ngineer
filed his original petition for a general adjudication of
4
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the rights to the use of the waters of Bear River drainage
area in Rich County, Utah (R. 1-5). On May 14, 1945,
an amended petition was filed (R. 6-8). An order was
, entered for publication of notice to water claimants, September 1, 1948 (R. 9).
~mne

two years after the filing of the original petition for a general adjudication, the United States Forest
Service and the Grazing Service (later known as the
Bureau of Land l\Ianagement) filed in the office of the
State Engineer, various applieations to appropriate
water for stockwatering purposes, all of which were
listed as approved claims in the State Engineer's "Pro- posed Determination of \Yater Rights in Bear River,
Rich County, Utah, Drainage Area," in 1951, pages 327
and 328.
On April 2, 1951, after the Proposed Determination
- ~1ad gone to press, the United States of Ameriea through
the Forest Service, filed with the State Engineer, "water
users' claims" numbered 1104 to 1115 inclusive, as "diligence rights" claims for stock watering, based upon the
alleged use of water in some instances as early as 1865.
A~ indicated in the Stipulation of facts, not one of those
claims was based on any alleged use by any agency of the
Federal government, nor by any officer or agent of the
United States, but based entirely on the use of water for
livestock made by various livestock operators who had
grazed their stock on government-owned lands. Those
claims were added to the Proposed Determination, as an
appenqix, pages 361 to 362.

s
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The State Engineer by his "Proposed Determination"
recommended allowance of all of the clain1s therein listed
including all of the clain1s filed by the United States of'
America. He further stated (Volume III, page ii):
"10. This proposal is intended to cover all
existing rights and those subsisting applications
initiated in the State Engineer's Office and not
perfected at this time within the area described.
The rights listed herein which are founded upon
contemplated appropriations of water by reas6n
of subsisting applications filed in the State Engineer's Office, are subject to their inclusion in a
decree conditioned upon compliance with the
terms of the applications upon which each respective conten1plated appropriation is based, and upon compliance with the provisions of the Laws of
the State of Utah relating thereto, and Proof of
Appropriation being made to the State Engineer
in compliance with said laws. At the end of the
five-year period herein-after mentioned, the status
of said applications shall be reported by the State
Engineer to the court, at which time the final decree should be 1nade to agree with the records of
said applications, as shown by the records in the
State Engineer's Office. Any applications which
are not perfected at the end of the five-year period
should be excluded from the decree.

,
•
'

1

"11. It is recommended that the rights to the
use of water within the area covered by this proposal be decreed to the various parties substantially as set forth herein. It is further recomInended that the court retain jurisdiction of this
case for a period of five years for the purpose of
making adjustments, correcting errors and for
such other purposes as time may indicate to the
6
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eourt as proper and just. In all matters whatsoever pertaining to this detennination and the decree to be rendered, the services and advice of the
::--itate Engineer are at all ti1nes available to the
eourt."
~\fter reeeipt of a eopy of the Proposed Determination, appellants in 1951 filed the following "Objections
to the Proposed Detennination of Water Rights in the
Bear RiYer Drainage of Rich County, Utah, by the State
Engineer" (R. Yol. II, pages 90-9-t-):

"Petitioners allege and petition the Court
as follows:
I
•· That they and each of them are owriers of
ranch and range lands located in the water drainage area herein concerned, which lands and the
forage produced annually thereon are used to feed
and to graze great numbers of livestock which
petitioners own and operate; that petitioners also
graze, in addition to the lands they own and individually control, the public domain and Forest
Reserve lands of the United· States of America
which are located in this drainage area with said
livestock. That petitioners and their predecessors
in interest have conducted the said livestock op~
er3:tions for a period of time prior to the year
1900 and continuously since that date.
II
"That located upon and coursing through and
across the above said privately owned, public domain and Forest Reserve lands are waters which
the petitioners and their respective predecessors
7
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in interest have used to water said livestock and to
irrigate certain of their ranch lands for all of the
above said period of time.
III

"That petitioners have each appropriated the
waters and the rights to the use of waters as the
State Engineer for the State of Utah sets out in
his 'proposed determination of water righb'
which have been filed with the Court in this case,
and each of the petiitioners now own exelusiYely
the rights to the use of the waters as proposed
by the State Engineer in his said proposal, and
have a continuing need for the use of these water~.

IV.
"That the l-:-nited States of America has, ~ince
the State Engineer's original petition which initiated this action for a determination of the water
rights concerned was filed herein, through ib departments of Agriculture and Interior, filed with
the said State Engineer numerous applications
and claims for the appropriation and recognized
use and rights to the use of certain waters a~ listed
and set out in the said proposed determination
submitted to this Court by the State Engineer:
that the said applications are identified in the
proposal for determination of these water right:-;
by the State Engineer and at the page of ~aid
document as follows:

w.u.
Application
No.

Claim
No.

Page

16887
20337

778
993

327
327

Source
Well
Well

8
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16~~1

--·)

II ...

•h).J .... I

Ht'~PrYoir

Hi~ II

l(i~

•)·),)
(

a-~:38~
Hi~~l9

1096
110
lSI
769

0-1
').)0-1

~~!i

0-1

3:27

Spring
'Vell
Spring
Reservoir
Spring
Reservoir
Reservoir
Reservoir
Well
Reservoir
Well
Reservoir
Reservoir
Spring
Spring
Spring
Spring
Well
Reservoir
Spring
R.eservoir
Reservoir
Reservoir
Well
Spring
Spring
Spring
Spring
Spring
Spring
Vvell
Spring

Hi I~~
1liSIS
16787
16886
16807

17~-±0

771
793
1018
796
1016
790
789
ISO

17:27~

78~

172-±1
16786
20077
1()789
16806
16808
16882
16884

781
785
1098
788
792
794
77:3
775
100-±
795
77-!
791
719
771
784
1099
776

19G:2~
1()~10

l~lSI~

16791
16790

:21~97

16809
16883
16805
17239
16880
16785
1995-t
16885

....

3·>... I
'),)-

3~7
'),)-

~3:27

327
').)-

0-'

3:27
3:27
327
327

3:27
327
327
327
327
327
327
327
327
328
328
328
328
328
328
328
328
328

"rrhat in addition to the above listed applications for appropriation the United States of
America has also filed with the State Engineer
numerous clai1ns to the use of water in the area

9
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here involved, which said clain1s are each made as
a diligence right and for livestock watering purposes. The said claims are listed in the appendix
of the State Engineer's said proposed determination at the page and with claim numbers and
source of water as follows, they having been filed
after the said proposed determination has been
submitted to the printer.
Claim No.

Page

1104
1105
1106
1107
1108
1109
1110
1111
1112
1113
1114
1115

361
361
361
361
361
361
361
361
361
362'
362
362

l

Sou.rce
Creek
Creek
Creek
Stream
Creek
Creek
Creek
Creek
Creek
Creek
Creek
Creek

ill

"That the United States of America has not
heretofore made any use of the waters included
in its above said claims and applications·, nor has
it made any other beneficial use thereof as contemplated by the laws of the State of Utah; that
no legislation is pending for the purpose of authorizing the United States of America to own
or to operate livestock which might make any
beneficial use of the said waters, nor is there any
reasonable possibility that the United States of
America may, in the forseeable future, put said
waters or any part thereof to any other beneficial
use.
10
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v
"'That the said applications and claims filed
bY the enited States of Anlerica conflict with
right~ to the use of waters held individually by
petitioners; and a1nount to representations by the
said applicant that there are waters available surplus to the needs of petitioners or others, whereas
no such surplus waters exist in said area; that
such representations on the part of the said applicant serve no useful purpose and tend to cast a
cloud upon the water rights owned within this
area by petitioners; that since the United States
of An1erica has 1nade no beneficial use of said
waters and is in no position to 1nake such use
thereof now nor in the foreseeable future, no appropriation of said water can be recognized nor
granted under governing law and regulations; and
that the endeavor on the part of the United States
to assume and take control of the waters described in its considerable number of applications
and claims amounts toan unlawful attempt to
deny to citizens an opportunity to acquire this
property.

VI
"That the State Engineer proposes in his
above mentioned proposed determination of the
water rights in the drainage area herein concerned, to grant'to the Pnited States of America
a period of five years within which to comply with
the requirements of law as to the applications
heretofore listed, and proposes that a final determination of the water rights in this area be not
made until the end of said period.
VII
"That the State Engineer recommends in his
11
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proposed determination herein filed that the decree of this Court now recognize and approve the
diligence claims of the United States of America
as heretofore listed and set forth in the appendix
at pages 361 and 362 of the said proposed deter.
mination, and that the decree of this Court award
to the United States of An1erica the rights to the
use of the waters described in said claim.
''NOW, THEREFORE, petitioners and each
of them respectfully pray for judgment a~ fol.
lows:
"1. That an order now be issued awarding
no part of the water rights as listed herein to the
United States of America, and which order shall
adjudge and decree that the United States of
America has never made and is unable to make a
beneficial use of waters for livestock watering
purposes as is contemplated and required by the
laws of the State of Utah; that such beneficial use
is necessary to complete an appropriation of
waters in this State, and rejecting each application and diligence claim filed by the United States
of America as listed herein.
"2. Ordering and directing the State Engineer to immediately reject each of the applications filed by the United States of Ameriea as
herein listed, together with any other application
for similar appropriations which might have been
filed for ·or in behalf of the United Htatt>~; and
ordering and directing the State Engineer to issue
such notices as may be required to show the denial
of each of the diligence clain1s filed for the m;e of
waters in the drainage area herein concerned.
"3. For such other and further relief
the Court may seem just and equitable."

a~

to
~

12
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rrhe o-bjections filed by appellants to all of the claims
a~~erted on behalf of the Federal Government, came on
for hearing on August 20, 1932, (R. 28-44). At said hearing, appellant~ orally Inoved to strike each and every
one of the claiins of the United States of An1erica listed
in said Proposed Detennination (R. 28-30). Appellants
moved to strike each of the "diligence rights" claims
listed on pages 361 to 362 upon each of the following
grounds:
1. The so-called diligence rights and each of them
are invalid on the face of the record, inasmuch as they
purport to antedate the existence of the Forest Service
of the United States-many years prior to the creation
of the Forest Service - and no diligence right could
possibly have been acquired by any agency prior to its
existence.

2. The Forest Service at no time owned any livestock in the area.

3. Neither the United States of America not the
Forest Service operated any livestock in the area so as
to be able to acquire any diligence water rights .
There has never been any authority of law for
the United States Forest Service or the Bureau of Land
Management to operate in the livestock business, and
therefore, no authority to appropriate water under the
law.
.f.

5.

The claims are based not on any use made by the

13
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United States of America, but on use made hy individual
water users, who did not act in any governmental capacity nor on behalf of the United States of America.
6. The claims are contrary to Federal law, which
precluded the Government fr01n claiming water rights,
particularly in the capacity in which the claims were
filed. The decisions of the United States Supreme Court
based upon statutes enacted as early as 1866, recognized
the fact that the United States had no water rights nor
could claim water rights on the public doma.in.
Appellants also moved to strike each of the claims
of the United States of America listed on pages 327 and
328 of the Proposed Deternrination, upon the same
grounds (R. 30), and in addition thereto protestants
alleged:
Application No. 16887, clai1n No. 778,
Application No. 16878, claim No. 769,
. '~
Application No. 16807, claim No. 793,
Application No. 16886, claim No. 777,
Application No. 16810, claim No. 796,
Application No. 19872, claim No. 1016,
Application No. 16790, claim No. 789,
Application No. 17240:, claim No. 780,
·j
Application No. 17272, claim No. 782,
:·:~
Application No. 16808, claim No. 794,
Application No. 16789, claim No. 788,
Application No. 16882, clai1n No. 773,
have all lapsed and therefore there is nothing to ad'li'•

1·1
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judieate; and applicants are to be allowed five years in
\rhieh to perfect appropriations, but beneficial use is
impossible as to any of those applications. Application
Ko. 17~41, clain1 No. 781, and application No. 16786, claim
Xo. 785, were withdra·wn according to the information reeein•d at the State Engineer·s office, and such applieation~ could not be allowed in this proceeding. In addition thereto, the balance of the applications and each and
all of the applications are predicated upon a claim of a
right to appropriate water, not on the. basis of any use
made by the United States of America, but on the basis
of use by permittees of the United ~tates of America,
which is contrary to la\v. The United States of America
has invoked a regulation to the effect that no person
is entitled to a pennit and he is not regarded as a bona
fide livestock operator unless he· actually owns and operates livestock, and therefore, by its own regulation the
United States of America is precluded from asserting
a water right under any of these applications; and it is
also precluded from asserting any diligence rights.
(R. 30-32, Exhibit "A").
It was admitted at the h_earing that the United States
of Arne-Pica is not a livestock operator in the area. It
owns no cattle ranches and no livestock (R. 33).
Following said hearing of August 20, 1952, a written
Stipulation was entered into between the United States
of America, the State Engineer, and the appellants herein, filed September 10, 1952, which Stipulation of facts
is as follows (R. 12-15) :
15
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''STIPrLATION
"The water rights asserted hy the United
States of America in this case, are limited to
rights which can be acquired under the laws of the
state of Utah. Any sovereign rights which the
United States of America might claim in or with
respect to the waters of Bear River as an interstate stream, are not listed in the Proposed Determination of the State Engineer, and are not before the court. The alleged water rights of the
United States consist of (1) so-called "diligence
rights," based upon an alleged beneficial use initiated prior to 1903 and evidenced by water user~·
claims filed with the State Engineer allegedly pursuant to the provisions of Section 3, Chapter !li,
Laws of Utah 1949, and (2) application for appropriation of water filed by the United States allegedly pursuant to the provisions of Chapter :1,
Title 100, Utah Code Annotated 1943, as amended.
"IT IS STIPULATED:

"1. On or about April 2, 1951, the United
States of America filed ·with the State Engineer
water users' claims numbered 1104 to 1115, both
inclusive, which claims are listed as diligence
claims in the Proposed Determination on pagP~
361 and 362. The diligence claims are based upon
the use of water for stock watering purposes h~·
livestock operators and others who in the pa~t
have grazed livestock on the public domain. ~n('h
use commenced in 1875 and has continued down
to the present time.
"2. The United States of America has
neither owned nor operated any of the livestock
which has watered at the sources of supply or at
any of the watt>ring places listed in either the

16
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

claims of diligence right~ or in the applieation~
for appropriation. ~\ny beneficial u:se of the
water::; with which the lTnited ~tates or an~· governmental agene~· i~ here concerned is a use nmde
by Jiye::;toek exelnsiYely owned and operated by
intere::-;ts other than the rnited ~tates of Anreriea.
"~j. :X o grazing pennits were issued on the
Cache Xational Forest by the United States Forest
~en·ice prior to 1906, and no permits for grazing
of liYestock on public lands of the United States
outside of the national forest were issued prior
to 1935.

"±. In filing the aforesaid diligence rights
clainrs on April :2, 1951, the officials of the United
~tates at \vhose instance said claims were filed,
did so in the belief that the past use of the water
at the points listed in the claims, by livestock operators, has inured to the benefit of the United
~tates of Arnerica. In filing the applications to
appropriate \Vater, the government officials at
whose instance such applications were filed, did
so with the purpose of acquiring for the United
States of America, water rights through the use
of \\·ater by livestock operators grazing livestock
under permits issued by the United States for
the use of forage grown on public lands.
"5. The sources of water supply described in
the so-called "diligence rights" claims described
above, and in the applications for appropriation
filed by the Pnited States of America as listed
below, arise generally upon public lands of the
Fnited States, with the possible exception of Little
Crawford Spring, shown in the State Engineer's
Proposed Determination as Claim No. 275. Waters
frmn some of said sources run off the public lands,
onto privately owned lands of objectors and
17
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others. All streams referred to in the diligence
claims listed above, and in the applications for
appropriation listed below, run through public
lands and also through privately owned lands in
Rich County, Utah. The objectors and other livestock operators in the area concerned, own ranches
and also range lands, through which these streams
run. Sorne of these privately owned lands border
upon and some lie across each of the streams mentioned in the claims filed by the United States of
America. Objectors and other livestock operators
also own lands in the vicinity of each of the
streams and springs hereinabove mentioned, so
that the waters involved in controversy can be
properly utilized by livestock which graze on
these privately owned lands.
"6. The following applications for appropriation of water were filed by the Unit~d States·
with the State Engineer of the State of rtah, were
approved by him and according to the records of
his office are in good standing.

17239
17240
17272
20337
16881
16877
A-2388
16879

16788
16787
19622
16791
20077
16806
16884
21297

16809
16883
16805
16880
16785
19954
16885

I

"7. The following applications for appropriation of water were filed by the l ~nited States
with the State Engineer, were approved hy him,
but subsequently such applications lapsed or were
withdrawn:
18
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172-!1*
16887
l()SIS

1(iSS(i

16807
16810

19872
16790
16786*

16789
16808
16882

"S. The objectors herein claim rights as
listed in the State Engineer's Proposed Deterlnination, on the sa1ne streams or water courses,
but down-stream fron1 points of diversion specified in the clain1s or applications of the United
States of A1nerica. Objectors also claim rights in
opposition to the clai1ns of the United States as
listed in the State Engineer's Proposed Deternlination, designated as follows:

United States'

Objectors'
Claim
682

Page
156

508
275
499
495
500

156
129
173
152
155

Source
Claim
Upper Otter Creek
779
Spring
Upper Otter Creek
779
Little Crawford Spg. 780
784
Hawk Spring
Old Canyon ~pring
795
Otter Creek Spring
774

Page
328

328
327
328
328
326

,

The foregoing Stipulation was approved by the court
on September 13, 1952, at the further hearing on the objections of appellants (R. 44). At said hearing the
United States of A1nerica agreed to withdraw claim to
Little Crawford Spring situated on privately owned land
(R. 47). The Bountiful Livestock Company was added
to the list of objectors (R. 50).
At said hearing counsel for the United States of
America stated for the record that "the whole purpose
of the Vnited States and the agencies actively making
claims to the water in this case" is "entirely for the bene-
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fit of permitees and other grantees to graze on the public lands" (R. 51). The following state1nent taken from
each application filed by the United States was read into
the record as part of the staten1ent of the purpose of the
Government in making the filings (R. 52):
"The purpose of the appropriation is to provide water for livestock using the surrounding
federal range and to conserve and regulate the
public grazing lands to stabilize the liYestock industry dependent on the1n and in aid thereof to
promote proper use of the privately controlled
lands and water dependent upon the public grazing lands. The quantity of water sought to be apvropriated is limited to that which can be beneficially used by the persons herein described."
Counsel for the objectors then offered in evidence,
and the court received in evidence, Exhibit "A", the Federal Range Code for Grazing Districts. Exhibit "B", was
admitted in evidence, which is a map pertaining to Forest
Reserve lands involved in this case, \vhich shows that
privately owned and state owned lands are eheckerboarded in many instances with federally owned land
(R. 53-54).
With respect to the "diligence rights" claims, it wa~
stipulated in open court that the United Ntate~ withdrew its claims of priority as to any uses elaimed to he
in conflict with the claim of appellants, so that the claims
asserted by the Federal governinent would be junior to
the claims of objectors (R. 55-57, 63-65). After the ('a~e
was argued by written memoranda, the Honorable Lt>wi~
20
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J one~, di~trict judge, iBsued hi8 l\le1noranduu1 of decision on January 1~, 1953, as follows (R. 16-17):
.. Objectors haYe InoYed to strike from the
propo:::ed final decree certain portions thereof
wherein water righb are proposed hy the State
Engineer of Ftah to be decreed to the United
State:::;. By oral argu1nent and written brief, these
parties challenge the legal right of the United
State~ to own or control water rights in this State
in connection with the adn1inistration of public
lands under the Land ~.Ianagement statutes. Each
of these springs or water courses arise on the public lands within Rich County.
''Questions presented include: whether
springs which ari'se on the public domain and
never reach private property passed to the control
of Utah under the Enabling and subsequent Acts;
whether the United States can claim 'diligence'
rights by reason of the manner of use of said
springs prior to the creation of the Forest Service; whether there has ever been satutory authorization for the United States to take the title to
or hold water rights either in its own right or as a
trustee for its permitees under the several E'orest
Service and Land Management statutes; whether
(assuming that the appropriation must be made
under Utah law) the government has had tho se
tools or animals under its control so that the use
n1ade of the waters appropriated, or sought to be
appropriated, is the use of the United States and
not the use of someone else ; and whether (same
assumption as supra) the State Engineer's approval of certain applications to appropriate
water rights (and the issuance of the usual certificate of appropriation under our statute) can be
subjected to collateral attack in this proceeding.
1
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"At the hearing a written stipulation of facts
was submitted by the parties. During the oral
argun1ent, the United States withdrew its claim
No. 780 on Little Crawford Springs and further
stipulated that the final decree might recite that
in each case of appropriation of water by the
United States fron1 the same stream or other
source of supply, the· priority of objectors' rights
may be shown in the final decree as senior to the
priority of the Government's rights. This waiver
on the part of the United States does not satisfy
the objectors. They maintain that they will still
be injured because they will be barred in the future from acquiring new rights should the Government be allocated any water rights whatsoever.
Objectors further maintain that the Government
should not be permitted to pre-empt the water
and thereby control the livestock industry in the
bureaucratic manner in which it has been functioning in the past.
"But, in view of the waiver of priority on the
part of the government, I do not feel that a justiciable controversy is presented for determination. See Huntsville Irrigation Co. v. District
Court, 72 Utah 431.
"The attorneys for the Government may prepare findings, conclusions, and a proposed interlocutory decree covering the issues raised in this
particular proceedings, serve copies on counsel
and mail the original to n1e at Brigham. In thi:-;
way it will be possible for the objectors to take an
intermediate appeal, should they be so advised,
prior to the signing of the final decree."
The findings of fact recite that "the United States
of America on various dates subsequent to the year 1944
22
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-._

made applications under State law for appropriation
of water for stock watering purposes" at points on
public lands: that the g-overnntent also filed diligence
claim~ nlunbered 110-l to 1115 inclusive, which claims
are listed on pages 361 to 36:2 of the Proposed Detennination; that as shown by the Stipulation, objectors
claim rights as listed in the Proposed Determination, on
the same streams or water courses, but down-stream
from points of diversion specified ·in the claim s or applications filed by the United States of America, and
objectors also claim rights in opposition to the clain1s
of the United States listed in the Proposed Determination
which are enurnerated; that it was ·stipulated that "in
each case of appropriation of water by the United States
from a source of supply from which the objectors have
made an appropriation, the priority of objectors' rights
is senior to the priority of the right of the United
States;" and that "the claim of the United States to the
water of Little Crawford Spring, evidenced by Claim
No. 780, page 327 of the Proposed Determination, could
be considered withdrawn because the claim was made
upon the assumption that the Little Crawford Spring
was located_ on public land, where, as a matter of fact,
such spring is located on private land." (R. 18-19).
1

By conclusion of law it is specified that the United
States of America "is entitled to an Interlocutory Decree
overruling and denying the objections to the Prop01sed
Determination interposed by Randolph Land and Livestock Company, Desert Livestock Company, Harold
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Selman, Nick Chournos, Orval Johnson and "\Villiam
Johnson and declaring that there is no justiciable i~8ne
or contest between the objectors, or any of them, and
the United States of A1nerica." (R. 19). By the interlocutory decree it is provided (R. 20):
"IT IS ORDERED, ADJrDGED AXD DECREED:
"1. That there is no justiciable controversy
between the objectors, Randolph Land and Livestock Company, Desert Livestock Company, Harold Selman, Nick Chournos, Orval Johnson and
William Johnson, or any of them, on the one hand,
and the United States of America, on the other
hand, over the claims of the United States of
America li'Sted in the Proposed Determination
herein.
"2. That the objections to the claims of the
United States to the water of Bear River, listed
in the State Engineer's Proposed Determination
on pages 327, 328, 361 and 362, which said objections were heretofore interposed by the objectors
above named, be and they are hereby overruled
and denied and the Petition setting forth the
objections of said objectors is hereby dismissed.''
For purposes of this appeal, it is assumed that
counsel for the United States of America intended to
include the Bountiful Livestock Company as one of the
objectors, inasmuch as it was joined at the hearing on
August 20, 1952; and that the denial of the objections
applies with equal force to said corporation as well as
to the objectors actually named.
On March 17, 1953, this Honorable Court granted the
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petition for appeal fr01n the interlocutory dt>erPP entered
Fehruary 7, 1953.

POI:\'T~

OX \YHIC'H ~\PPl~LLANTS RELY FOR
OF THE IXTERLOCUTORY DECREE

REYEHS~\L

Point Ko. 1
A PROCEEDING FOR THE COMPLETE ADJUDICATION
OF RIGHTS TO THE USE OF WATER OF A RIVER SYSTEM
cr;DER SECTIONS 100-4-12 AND 15·, U. C. A. 1943, IS .A
PROCEEDING FOR THE DETERMINATION OF THE
PRESENT RIGHTS TO THE USE OF THE WATERS OF THE
RIVER SYSTEM, NOT WHAT THOSE RIGHTS MIGHT
HAVE BEEN SOME YEARS AGO.

Point No. 2
IN A GENERAL WATER ADJUDICATION CASE, THE
OBJECTION BY A KNOWN WATER USER TO THE STATE
ENGINEER'S PROPOSED ALLOWANCE OF CERTAIN
WATER CLAIMS BY A LANDOWNER WHO HAS NEVER
USED THE WATER AND WHO DOES NOT PRESENTLY
MAKE ANY BENEFICIAL USE OF THE WATER, DOES
NOT CONSTITUTE A COLLATERAL ATTACK UPON SOME
PRIOR PROCEEDING BEFORE THE STATE ENGINEER,
BUT A DIRECT ATTACK UPON THE CLAIM THAT SUCH
CLAIMANT PRESENTLY HAS A RIGHT TO THE USE OF
THE WATER.

Point No. 3
NEITHER THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NOR
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ANY OTHER LANDOWNER ON WHOSE LAND WATER
ARISES, CAN ACQUIRE DILIGENCE RIGHTS TO THE USE
OF WATER FOR LIVESTOCK UPON SUCH LAND, WHEN
THE ONLY BENEFICIAL USE OF WATER WAS MADE BY
LIVESTOCK OWNERS AND OPERATORS OTHER THAN
THE LAND OWNER AND WHICH LIVESTOCK OPERATORS
NEITHER OPERATED UNDER PERMISSION OF OR
AGREEMENT WITH THE LANDOWNER OR IN SUBORDINATION TO THE LANDOWNER.

Point No. 4
WHERE THE LIVESTOCK OPERATORS WHO ACTUALLY MADE THE BENEFICIAL USE OF THE WATER (OR
THEIR SUCCESSORS IN INTEREST), HAVE ACQUIRED
DILIGENCE RIGHTS TO THE USE OF THE WATER, THE
LANDOWNER WHO NEVER USED THE WATER AND HAD
NO INTEREST IN SUCH LIVESTOCK CANNOT CLAIM
DILIGENCE RIGHTS PREDICATED UPON SUCH USE
MADE EXCLUSIVELY BY OTHERS WHEN THERE WAS NO
PRIVITY WHATSOEVER.

Point No. 5
THE STIPULATION OF FACTS IN THIS CASE SHOWS
CONCLUSIVELY THAT THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NEVER ACQUIRED ANY DILIGENCE RIGHTS TO THE
USE OF WATER, AND THAT THE DILIGENCE RIGHTS
CLAIMS WHICH THE STATE ENGINEER PROPOSES TO
HAVE INCORPORATED INTO THE DECREE ON BEHALF
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ARE VOID.

Point No. 6
PRIOR TO THE 1941 AMENDMENT, EXCEPT FOR PUR-
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POSES OF THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, THE UNITED
STATES HAD NO AUTHORITY UNDER THE STATE
STATUTES TO FILE ON WATER, AND THERE IS NO
FEDERAL STATUTE WHICH AUTHORIZES THE FOREST
SERVICE OR THE BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT TO
MAKE WATER APPLICATIONS, AND CONSEQUENTLY
SUCH APPLICATIONS WERE AND ARE VOID.

Point No. 7
THE STIPULATION OF FACTS SHOWS THAT EVEN
IF THERE HAD BEEN ANY AUTHORITY OF THE UNITED
. STATES OF AMERICA TO FILE APPLICATIONS TO
APPROPRIATE WATER IN THIS STATE, SUCH APPLICATIONS IN QUESTION WERE VOID AB INITIO IN VIEW OF
THE FACT THAT THE STIPULATION OF FACTS SHOWS
THAT THERE WAS NO INTENTION ON THE PART OF
THE APPLICANT TO PUT THE WATER TO BENEFICIAL
USE.

Point No. 8
THE DECLARED PURPOSE IN EACH OF THE APPLICATIONS FILED BY THE UNiTED STATES OF AMERICA
IS SHOWN TO BE AN ATTEMPT TO PREEMPT THE
WATER, TO GAIN A MONOPOLY AND TO CONTROL
OTHER LANDS OF PRIVATE CITIZENS AND TO "REGULATE" THE PUBLIC GRAZING LANDS, AND SUCH PURPOSES ARE FOR THE DOMINATION OF THE PROPERTY
RIGHTS OF OTHERS AND NOT FOR THE APPLICATION
OF WATER TO BENEFICIAL USE BY THE LANDOWNER
OR APPLICANT.

Point No. 9
THE STIPULATION SHOWS THAT SOME OF THE
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APPLICATIONS LAPSED OR WERE WITHDRAWN, AND
THAT WHERE CERTIFICATES OF APPROPRIATION
WERE ISSUED SUCH PROOF WAS FALSE AND THAT NO
WATER HAS EVER BEEN PUT TO BENEFICIAL USE, SO
THAT THERE ARE NO EXISTING RIGHTS TO THE USE
OF WATER AND NO BENEFICIAL USE OF WATER BEING
MADE UPON WHICH ANY ADJUDICATION CAN BE MADE
IN FAVOR OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

ARGUMENT

Point No. 1
A PROCEEDING FOR THE COMPLETE ADJUDICATION
OF RIGHTS TO THE USE OF WATER OF A RIVER SYSTEM
UNDER SECTIONS 100-4-12 AND 15', U. C. A. 1943, IS A
PROCEEDING FOR THE DETERMINATION OF THE
PRESENT RIGHTS TO THE USE OF THE WATERS OF THE
RIVER SYSTEM, NOT WHAT THOSE RIGHTS MIGHT
HAVE BEEN SOME YEARS AGO.

At the further hearing on the objections filed by
appellants, held on Septen1ber 13, 1952, counsel for the
United States ~sought to obviate the objections of appellants, by acknowledging the claims of appellants to be
prior and senior to the claims asserted by the Federal
government (R. 55-57, 16-20, 63-65). The appellants as
objectors refused to treat such waiver on the part of
the government, as a termination of the justiciable controversy. The learned trial judge, however, adopted the
contention of respondents that such a "waiver" on the
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l\.lJ.lpart of the Federal governn1ent ''ter1ninated the con~P~flicts. ·· and that there was no longer any "justiciable
:i'-;eontroYersy."
(R.16-17, 57-61).
,.._

!1}1'1;:·

'<1'1:1~
-..

\Ye contend that the trial court was in error in
:.U~! dismissing· the objections to the allowance of both the
~ "diligence rights" clai1ns and the clain1s based upon
alleged applications for appropriation asserted by the
United States, and in decreeing that there is no justiciable controYersy, for the reason ·that the statutes of this
State contemplates that the court in a general adjudieation proceeding shall determine not only the priority
of rights, but also what are the present rights to the
use of the water, in quantity, manner and nature of use,
and also time of use.
~:.:_

~~

.~:

·,r

1! i~
~

r

_:

An examination of the statutes inexorably leads to
the conclusion that the purpose of a general adjudication
action is to ascertain and define : (a) Who are the persons who presently claim the rights to use the waters~
(b) Which claims are presently valid in whole or in
part~ (c) As to the claims which are presently valid,
how much wa.ter is each claimant presently entitled to
use, and at what time and in what manner? (d) What
are the priorities with respect to the present rights to
use the water~
Section 100-4-1, U. C. A. 1943 (73-4-1, U. C. A. 1953)
specifies:
"Upon a verified petition to the State Engineer, signed by five or more or a majority of
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water users upon any stream or water source,
requesting the investigation of the relative rights
of the various claimants to the waters of such
stream or water source, it shall be the duty of
the state engineer, if upon such investigation he
finds the facts and conditions are such as to
justify a determination of said rights, to file in
the di,strict court an action to determine the various rights. In any suit involving water rights
the court may order an investigation and smTe~·
by the state engineer of all of the '"a ter rights
on the source or system involved."
The statute is clear in defining the scope of such a
proceeding ws one to investigate "the relative rights of
the various claimants to the waters," and to "determine
the various rights." Nowhere in the statute is there any
authority to allow the establishment of fictitious claims
as valid water rights. While the statute does not employ
the phrwse "at the present time," we believe such is
implicit in the statute, and also evidenced by the language of the context of the several statutes relating to
general adjudications. By Section 100-4-3, U. C. A. 1943
(73--4-3, U. C. A. 1953), the State Engineer is required
to "prepare and file with the court a statement giving
the names and addresses of all the claimants to the use
of water from the river 'System or water source involved
in such actions," and "to this end the clerk of the
court shall publish" notice of the pendency of such action
and requiring the claimants to notify the State gng-ineer
of their names and addresses for the purposes indicated.
In Smith v. District Court, 69 Utah 493, 256 P. 539,
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thi~ Court held that the statute was intended to prevent
piecemeal litigation in the detennination of water rights,
and to provide 1neans of detennining all rights in one
action, as the only effectual n1ethod of preventing a
multiplicity of suits. "~ e believe that the decisions of
this Honorable Court at least in1ply that the purpose
of ~ueh a suit is to detennine what water rights the
various clain1ants actually enjoy at the time of the
adjudication, not what the party claims nor even what
those rights n1ight have been in the remote past.

Section 100-1-3, U. C. A. 1943 (73-1-3, U. C. A. 1953),
declares that "Beneficial use shall be the basis, the
rnea:sure and the limit of all rights to the use of water
in this state." Water rights, other than diligence rights
which were acquired prior to 1903, can be acquired only
by appropriation. "for some useful and beneficial purpose." Section 100-3-1, U. C. A. 1943, (73-3-1, U. C. A.
1953). By the terms of Section 100-1-4, U. C. A. 1943,
(73-1-4, U. C. A. 1953), "When an appropriator or his
successor in interest shall abandon or cease to use water
for a period of five years the right shall cease, and
thereupon such water shall revert to the public, and
may be again appropriated as provided in this title ..."
In the light of these statutes, in a general adjudication of the water rights of a river system, the court could
not properly decree that a claimant is presently entitled
to use 10.00 c. f. s. of water for irrigation, where for
illustration, the undisputed evidence showed: (a) The
elaimant in 1920 properly filed application to appropri3:1
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ate 10.00 c. f. s. of water for that purpose, and his application was approved, but (b) the water clai1nant never
actually put more than 3.00 c. f. s. of water to beneficial
use, and finally (c) in 1935 the claimant ceased altogether to use any water and he never again resumed the
use of water nor filed any application with the State
Engineer required by Section 100-1-4 for an extension
of time in which to resume the use of the water.
Section 100-:-4-5; U. C. A. 1943, (73-4-5, U. C. A. 1953),
requires each water claimant who is ·served with notice
in a general adjudication proceeding, to file his claim,
showing not only where the water was first diverted
and put to beneficial use, and the flow, but also "the
place and manner of present use," and "such other facts
as will clearly define the extent and nature of the
appropriation claimed."
Section 100-4-11, U. C. A. 1943, (73-4-11, U. C. ~\.
1953), defines the duty of the State Engineer in making
his report to the court :
"Within thirty days after the expiration of
the sixty days allowed for filing statemenb of
claims, the state engineer shall begin to tabulate
the facts contained in the statements filed and to
investigate, whenever he shall deem neces~ary, the
facts set forth in said statements by reference to
the surveys already made or by further ~un'l'y~,
and shall as expeditiously as possible make a
report to the court with his recommendations of
how all rights involved shall be determined.
"After full consideration of the statement of
clain1s, and of the :·mr\'e~'s, records, and files, and

32
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

after a personal exmnination of the river H)'8tem
or water source involved, if 8twh examination is
deemed neee:s:snry, the :state engineer shall formulate a report and a 1noposed d elcrm ina tion of all
rights to the w·•e of the zcater of such river system
or water source, and a eopy of the same shall
be 1nailed by reg-ular Inail to each clain1ant, with
notice that any claimant dissatisfied therewith
may within ninety days frmn such date of Inailing
file with the clerk of the district court a wirtten
objection thereto duly verified on oath. The state
engineer shall distribute the ·water from the
natural streams or other natural sources in
accordance ·with the proposed determination or
n1odification thereof by court order until a "final
decree is rendered by the court;· provided, if the
right to the use of said waters has been theretofore decreed or adjudicated said waters shall be
distributed in accordance with such decree until
the same is reversed, modified, vacated or otherwise legally set aside.' (Italics added.)
Section 100-4-12, U. C. A. 1943, (73-4-12, U. C. A.
1953), provides for judgment in the absence of any
contest:
"If no contest on the part of any claimant
shall have been filed, the court shall render a
judgment in accordance with such proposed
determination, which shall determine and establish the rights of the several claimants to the use
of the water of said river system or water source;
and among other things it shall set forth the name
and post-office address of the person entitled to
the use of the water; the quantity of water in
acre feet or the flow of water in second feet; the
time during which the water is to be used each
33
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year; the name of the stremn or other source
from which the water is diverted; the point on
the stremn or other source where the water i~
diverted; the priority date of the right; and such
other matters as will fully and completely define
the rights of said claimants to the use of the
water." (Italics added.)
The following provisions of the statute, 100-4-13 to
15 are applicable in the event of a contest:
"If any contest or objection on the part of
any claimant shall have been filed, as in this
chapter provided, the court shall give not less
than fifteen days' notice to all claimants, stating
when and where the matter will be heard." Section 100-4-13, U. C. A. 1943, (73-4-13, U. C. ~-\.
1953).
"The staternents filed by the claimants shall
stand in the place of pleadings, and issues may be
made thereon. Whenever requested so to do the
state engineer shall furnish the court with any
information which he may possess, or copies of
any of the records of his office which relate to
the water of said river system or water source.
The court may appoint referees, masters, engineers, soil specialists, or other persons as necessity or emergency may require to assist in taking
testimony or investigating facts, and in all proceedings for the determination of the rights of
claimants to the water of a river system or water
source the filed statements of claimants shall he·
competent evidence of the facts stated therein
unless the same are put in issue." Section 100-414, U. C. A. 1943, (73-4-14, U. C. A. 195:3).
"Upon the completion of the hearing, after
objections filed, the court shall enter judgment
34
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which shall deter1nine and establish the rights
of the several claiinants to the use of the water
of the river system or water source as provided
in section 100-4-12."
'rhe statutes above quoted and cited clearly n1ake
justiciable controversies of" disputes arising from the
challenge of the validity of water claiins listed in a proposed determination sub1nitted by the State Engineer,
inasmuch as. the court is required to determine the
"rights of the several clailnants to the use of the water
of the river system.'' The party whose claims are
assailed by objections which. deny that he is presently
the owner of any water rights whatsoever, cannot successfully avoid an adjudication of the issue a:s to the
validity of his claim by merely saying: "I hereby waive
all claims of priority with respect to the ciaims of the
objectors, and I consent to entry of a decree whereby my
rights will be junior in priority to all claims of the
objectors. Therefore, there is nothing further to adjudicate, and there is no longer any justiciable controversy,
the statutes to the contrary notwithstanding."
By reason of the fact that the duty of the court
qoes not end with a mere determination that the claims
of the objectors have priority over the claims filed by
the Federal government, the trial court was in error
in dismissing the objections filed by appellants, and in
failing to make a finding that all of the claims. filed by
the govern1nent are void. By dismissal of the objections,
the court inferentially denied the motion of appellants
to strike from the Proposed Determination all of the
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claims made by the United States of America, listed on
pages 327 and 328, and 361 to 362, and the court
indirectly approved all of those claims as recommended
by the State Engineer.
The interlocutory decree \Vas erroneous, in view of.
the undisputed facts, and it was also erroneous as a
matter of law. Said decree should be vacated and a ne\r
decree should be entered denying all of the water claims
asserted by and on behalf of the United States of
America and adjudging all of said claims to be null
and void.

~

Point No. 2
IN A GENERAL WATER ADJUDICATION CASE, THE
OBJECTION BY A KNOWN WATER USER TO THE STATE
ENGINEER'S PROPOSED ALLOWANCE OF CERTAIN
WATER CLAIMS BY A LANDOWNER WHO HAS NEVER
USED THE WATER AND WHO DOES NOT PRESENTLY
MAKE ANY BENEFICIAL USE OF THE WATER, DOES
NOT CONSTITUTE A COLLATERAL ATTACK UPON SOME
PRIOR PROCEEDING BEFORE THE STATE ENGINEER,
BUT A DIRECT ATTACK UPON THE CLAIM THAT SUCH
CLAIMANT PRESENTLY HAS A RIGHT TO THE USE OF
THE WATER.

At the hearing held on September 13, 1952, the
respondents made the contention during argument on
the objections of appellants that those objections constitute a collateral attack upon the proceedings before
the State Engineer. It was conceded that with respect
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"

to the so-called "diligenee rights'' claims filed by the
rnited States Forest ServicP on April :2, 1951, the
·appellants were given no opportunity to prote~t nor to
haYe anv• hearin()'
before the State Engineer (R. 65-66).
0
\Yith respect to the applications filed by the United
States beginning in 19-!4, all of which applications were
filed after this proceeding was initiated, the appellants
filed no protest with the State Engineer (R,. 66).
In the -~\Ie1norandmn filed by the trial court, it is
apparent that the trial judge viewed the objections filed
by appellants as a collateral attack on the proceed.ings
before the State Engineer (R. 16). Neither the finding
of fact, conclusions of law, nor the decree, 1nention
"collateral attack" (R. 18-19), although the holding that
there is no '"justiciable controversy" might well embrace
such a conclusion..
We wish to point out that objections filed to a
proposed determination of rights to the use of water,
as submitted to the court by the State Engineer, do not
constitute a collateral attack upon some prior proceedings before the State Engineer. The objections are made
to the claims filed in the general adjudication proceeding. Inasmuch as a water claimant in a general adjudication proceeding must file his water claim in such proceeding, and such claim must show the place and marnner
of present use (100-4-5 ), the filing of objections to a
particular water claim is an assertion in the general
adjudication proceeding that the claimant whose water
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claim is assailed by such objections does not presently
. have such water right as claimed.
The provisions of Section 100-4-11, U. C. A. 1943,
(73-4-11, U. C. A. 1953), specifically authorize any water
claimant who is dissatisfied with the proposed deterrnination sub1nitted by the State Engineer, to file a
"written objection" therto. The statute does not prescribe the particular grounds of objection. However,
we sub1nit that there are numerous valid grounds for
objections, which would include any of the following:
(a) The party whose claims of water rights are assailed
by objection, never actually made any appropriation
of water. (b) The party whose claims are assailed has
conveyed his rights or he has otherwise been divested
of the right to use any water. (c) The party has not
put to beneficial use all of the water cla~med. (d) The
right to the use of the water has been lost in whole or
in part by more than five years of nonuser. (d) The
water claimant admits in the adjudication proceeding
that his clairn, although approved by the State Engineer,
is erroneous or wholly unfounded.
An attack made upon the claims of one who asserts
rights to the use of water in a general adjudication case,
by objections filed in accordance with Section 100-4-ll,
is a direct attack which is specifically authorized hy
statut~. lt was never the intention of the Legislature
to facilita.te establishment of either extravagant or
fictitious \vater claims. General adjudications are
designed to establish actual rights as they have accrued
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and presently exist, and to reject erroneous and fictitious claims, and to srale down elailns which a rP exaggerated. Otherwise, the rule that "'Beneficial use shall
be the basis, the 1ueasure and the lilnit of all righb to
the use of water in this state" (Section 100-1-3), would
be nullified by indirection.
At the hearing held on Septmnber 13, 1952, argument was 1nade to the effect that objections by appellants
could not be entertained because the State Engineer
had already issued certificates in son1e instances where
the Federal government had filed applications (R. 5961). The statute relating to the issuance of a certificate
hy the State Engineer does not state that it shall be
conclusive evidence and invulnerable to attack in a
general adjudication proceeding. Section 100-3-17, U. C.
A. 1943, (73-3-17, U. C. A. 1953), declares inter alia.:
'' ... The certificate so issued and filed shall
be pri1na facie evidence of the owner's right to
the use of the water in the quantity, for the purpose, at the place, and during the time specified
therein, subject to prior rights."
The certificate is only prima facie evidence, which
means that such evidence can be refuted. In a general
adjudication proceeding, what happens to such prima
facie evidence in the light of an admission that the
alleged appropriator actually appropriated the water
and applied it to beneficial use for some years, but that
for more than five years prior to the general adjudication proceeding he abandoned the use of the water~
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The prima facie evidence is overcmne. Likewise, where
the water claims are assailed by proper objections to
the effect that the claimant has never applied any water
to beneficial use, and the claiinant in writing admits
that he has actually never appropriated any water to
beneficial use and that the proof sub1nitted to the State
Engineer was utterly false, the prinm facie evidence of
the certificate is totally destroyed, and the admission
of the claimant that he has never used the water beneficially, requires an adjudication that his claim is invalid.
The objections filed by appellants to allowance of
any of the claims asserted on behalf of the United State~,
were valid objections under the statutes, constituting a
direct attack upon the .claims of the United States of
America as to the right to the present use of the water.
In the light of the Stipulation of facts, the trial court
should have sustained each of the objections and granted
each motion to strike the claims asserted h)' the United
States as set forth in the proposed decree.

Point No. 3
NEITHER THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NOR
ANY OTHER LANDOWNER ON WHOSE LAND WATER
ARISES, CAN ACQUIRE DILIGENCE RIGHTS TO THE USE
OF WATER FOR LIVESTOCK UPON SUCH LAND, WHEN
THE ONLY BENEFICIAL USE OF WATER WAS MADE BY
LIVESTOCK OWNERS AND OPERATORS OTHER THAN
THE LAND OWNER AND WHICH LIVESTOCK OPERATORS
NEITHER OPERATED UNDER PERMISSION OF OR
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AGREEMENT WITH THE LANDOWNER OR IN SUBORDINATION TO THE LANDOWNER.

Our position i8 that the United State8 of America
is in no better position than any other landowner in
attempting- to acquire the right to use unappropriated
waters of this State. A landowner, like anyone else,
must comply with the law8 of this State pertaining to
acquisition of water rights. O"·nership of the land does
not give the landowner a right to the use of any unappropriated water arising on his land. Neither does
ownership of the land vest in him the right to use water
which has been lawfully appropriated by some other
person. Ownership of land does not constitute the owner
an appropriator of water. Jurisdiction over the appropriation of fugitive waters within the State is vested
in the State, not in the Federal government.
Nine years after this general adjudication proceeding was initiated, the United States Forest Service on
April 2, 1951, filed the ''diligence rights" claims for
stockwatering. which are controversy here. Disregarding
the fact that Congress never authorized the filing of
water claims by or for and on behalf of the F·orest
Service or any other Federal agency except the Bureau
of Reclamation, the United States was in no better
position legally than any other landowner who never
owned any livestock and ·who had never operated any
livestock nor put any water to beneficial use by livestock watering. When those claims were challenged by
objections in this proceeding, it was admitted by written
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stipulation that the livestock which actually used the
water was owned and operated by interests other than
the Federal government. By stipulation it was explained
that
"4. In filing the aforesaid diligence rights
claims on April 2, 1951, the officials of the
United States at whose instance said claims were
filed, did so in the belief that the past use of
water at the points listed in the claims, by livestock operators, has inured to the benefit of the
United States of America."
For the first time, the novel but patiently absurb
claim was advanced in 1951 that a landowner on whose
land the water arose, vicariously acquired water rights
for stockwatering purposes. Such claim was predicated
not on any acts of appropriation by the landowner, but
entirely on the belief of some government officials that
the application of :water to beneficial use by livestock
operators on gover~ment-owned lands, enured to the
benefit of the United States. That amounts to saying
that any landowner, who has never appropriated any
water to a beneficial use, can claim the benefit of appropriations made by livestock operators with whom there
is no privit)·, simply because such beneficial use wa~
made on his land.
The clai1ns of the government strike at the fundaInental basis of the entire doctrine that water rights
can only be acquired h~· appropriation for beneficial use.
If those claims were to be established a:-; law, there would
arise a novel :')·~tem of dual water rights-one ~Pt of
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~

water rights in t11e persons who actually put the watPr
to beneficial use as lawful appropriators, and duplieatP
set of water rights vested in the landownPr acquired
without any beneficial use by the landowner, but solely
bv virtue of a beneficial use made unon his ·}and hv
others.
Ownership of public land does not earry with
ownership of the migrating waters which arise on tho~
~r lands. Congress did not reserve to the United Stat€
of ~~merica in connection with any public lands, title to
the fugitive waters arising on those lands or flowing
through thern. Because of the absolute dependency of
citizens on the use of water originating on the public domain in the west, the rule of appropriation of \Vater for
beneficial use arose as a matter of necessity. Water arising on public lands becarne necessary for cities, mining,
stockwatering and agriculture. Congress did not see fit
to pre-empt the water arising on public lands~ The doctrine of riparian rights recognized at cormnon law, had
to yield to the march of progress in the West. As early
as 1866, Congress recognized the doctrine of a ppropriation of water for beneficial use. And it must not be overlooked, that such doctrine arose with respect to waters
arising on the public domain, inasmuch as there was
then very little privately owned land.
By the act of July 26, 1866, (14 Stat., 253), it was
recognized that citizens could acquire the use of waters
arising on public lands by application of water to beneficial use, and Congress expressly authorized the establishment of rights-of-ways over public lands for the construction of ditches and canals. As embodied in Sec.
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2339 of the Revised Statutes, 30 U. S. C. A. sec.
'
statute reads :

;)J

'

the

. "Whenever, by priority of possession, rights
to the use of water for 1nining, agricultural, manufacturing, or other purposes have vested and accrued, and the same are recognized and acknowledged by the local customs, laws, and the decisions
of courts, the possessors and owners of such vested
rights shall be maintained and protected in the
same; and the right-of-way for the construction
of ditches and canals for the purposes herein specified is acknowledged and confirmed; * * *."
By the act of _L\Iarch 3, 1891, (26 Stat., 1097), R. S.
2340,30 F. S. C.A. sec. 52, it was provided:
''All patents granted, or homesteads allowed,
shaH be subject to any vested and accrued water
rights, or rights to ditches and reservoirs used
in connection with such water rights, as may have
been acquired under or recognized by section
51 of this title."
The act of _March 3, 1877, (19 Stat., 377), known as
the "Desert Land Act," 4-3 U. N. C. A. 321, provided for
acquisition of title to 320 acres of desert land, by persons
who sought to conduct .water upon the said land in accordance with the rules and laws relating to a.pproprwtion;

"* * * That the right to the use of watPr hy
the person so conducting the san1e, on or to any
tract of desert land of three hundred and twenty
acres shall depend upon bona fide prior aJJJJropriation; and <..,·uch right shall not e.rcced the lliJIOUIIf
of 1cater actllally aJJ}JrO]Jriated, and JH'<'P:-i:-;aril~·
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,,

l

used for the purpo~e of irrig-ation aiHl rt>elnmation: and all surplus watPr over and above such
actual a.ppropriativn and use, togl:'tlwr with tlw
water of all lake8, riyer~, and other soun·c~ of
water supply upon the public lands and not navigable, shall re1nain and be held free for the appropriation and use of the public for irrigation,
mining and n1anufacturing purposes ~mbject to
existing rights. * * *" (Italics added).
In Tu·in Falls Salmon Rirer Laud, etc., Co. r. Cald~l., Idaho 1921), :272 F~ 356, affirmed 266 U.S.
85, 45 S. Ct. :2:2, 69 L. Ed 178, the court pointed out that·
the State has jurisdiction over the appropriation of water
for beneficial use:

well, (C. C.

"The relation of the federal government to
the state government in the reclamation of desert
lands arises out of the fact that the federal government owns the lands, and Congress is invested
by the Constitution with the power of disposing of
the same, while the state has been given jurisdiction to provide for the appropriation and beneficial use of the waters of the state which necessarily includes a use for the reclamation of such
lands."
Article XVI, Section 1, Constitution of Utah, which
was approved by Congress, provides :
"All existing rights to the use of any of the
waters in this State for any useful or beneficial
purpose, are hereby recognized and confirmed."
Thus, by approval of the State Constitution which was
adopted in 1895, Congress approved the doctrine of bene45
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flcial use of water, as part of the funda1nentallaw of this
State. That rule has never been changed.

By the terms of the Reclamation act of June 17,1902,
( 32 Stat. 390), Congress recognized the doctrine of appropriation, and also the paranwunt authority of the
state~ to control the acquisition of water rights. As set
forth in 431~. S.C. A. sec. 372:
"The right to the use of water acquired under
the provisions of the reclamation law shall be
appurtenant to the land irrigated, and beneficial
use shall be the basis, the measure, and the limit
of the right."
In -!3 F. S. C. A. sec. 383, of the same act, it is
provided:
"Nothing in this chapter shall be construed
as affecting or intending to affect or to in any
interfere with the laws of any State or TerritorY
relating to the control, appr~priation, use or di~
tribution of water used in irrigation, or any
vested right acquired thereunder, and the Seeretary of the Interior, in can·~ring out the provision~
of this chapter, shall proceed in conformity with
such laws, and nothing herein shall in any way
affect any right of any State or of the Federal
Government or of any landowner, appropriator,
or user of water in, to, or from any interstate
stream or the waters thereof."
Congress expressly recognized the rule that all rights
to the use of nonnavigable waters, had to be acquired
under state law. See Board of Directors, etc. r. Jorgensen, et al., 136 P. 2d 461. In a concurring opinion in that
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case, at pages 468 to 469, the aforesaid ~tatute is quotPd,
with the following observation:

"* • • The Reclaination Aet give~ to the
United States by and through its Secretary of the
Interior the same, but no superior, right to appropriate the public unappropriated waters of the
State of Idaho as the laws of this state give to the
individual. 43 P. S. C. A., §§ 372 and 383; United
States v. West Side Irr. Co., D. C., 230 F. 28-t."
As stated in United Sta.tes z·. Union Gap b-rigation
()o., 209 F. 27 4: "The govern1nent, like an individual, can
appropriate only so much water as· it applies to beneficial uses."

In construing the aforesaid provision of the Reclamation Act, in Ickes v. Fox, 300 U. S. 82, 81 L. Ed. 525,
57 S. Ct. 412, the United States Supren1e Court held that
the specified activities of the Federal government under
the act in the case then before the court, did not vest in
the government any title to the _water:
"* * * Although the government diverted,
stored and distributed the water, the contention
of petitioner that thereby ownership of the water
or water-rights became vested in the United States
is not well founded. Appropriation was made not
for the use of the government, but, under theReclamation Act, for the use of the landowners; and .
by the ter1ns of the law and of the contract alreadv
referred to, the water-rights becan1e the propert}T
of the landowners, wholly distinct from the prop. erty right of the government in the irrigation
works. Compare Murphy v. Kerr (D. C.) 296 F.
536, 544, 545. The government was arid ren1ained
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si1nply a carrier and distributor of the water
(ibid), with the right to receive the smns stipulated in the contracts as reimbursement for the
cost of construction and annual"charges for operation and maintenance of the works. A~ security
therefor, it was provided that the government
should have a lien upon the lands and tlze waterrights appurtenant thereto-a provision which in
itself imports that the water-rights belong to another than the lienor, that is to say, to the land
owner.

~

"The Federal government, as owner of the
public domain, had the power to dispose of the
land and water composing it together or separately; and h~T the Desert Land Act of 1S/1, (chap.
107, 19 Stat. at L. 377, 43 F. S. C. A. § 321), if not
before, Congress had severed the land and "'atPr;-;
constituting the public domain and established
the rule that for the future the lands should be
patented separately. Acquisition of the government title to a parcel of land was not to cmT~' with
it a water-right; but a1l non-navigable waters
were reserved for the use of the publie under the
laws of the various arid-land states. California
Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Ce11wnt Co., :2!);) r.
S. 142, 162, 79 L. ed. 1356, 1363, 55 S. Ct. 725. "" "",..,
There is no law of this State under which a lando_wner can claim the benefit of an appropriation of water
by others over whoru he has no control and with whom
there is no privit~'· Appropriation of unappropriated
waters in this Stab• can be made onl~, hy compliance with
State law. Even the government apparPntly recognized
this rule when it purported to file its fin-called "diligence
rights" e]aim~.
48
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An appropriation of water to beneficial use inYolves
three essential~, not one of which was ever ::-;atisfied 1>~'
the United ~tate~ Forest ~ervice in regard to the socalled "diligence clai1n~": (a) There must be an intent
to apply the water to some beneficial use. (b) There
must be a diversion of the water fr01n the strea1n or
source. (c) The water diverted 1nust be applied to beneficial use by the appropriator. Sowards v. 1lf eagher, 37
t:tah 21:2, 108 P. 111:2. ~-\s pointed out in Hague 17. Nephi
Irn:gation Co., "appropriation" does not merely 1nean a
diYersion of water, but involves an intention on the part
of the appropriator to put the water to a beneficial use
and also the actual application of the water to a beneficial use; so that if a party diverts more than he can
benefically use, he does not actually appropriate the
excess.
In Robinson u. Shoenfelt, 62 Utah 233, 218 P. 1041,
the plaintiff claimed a diligence right for stockwatering
at a spring upon the public domain in Kane County, Utah,
and he sought to enjoin interference hy defendant. While
the proof showed that he had watered cattle at the spring,
he had not watered his cattle to the exclusion of other
cattle operators on the public domain, and the court held
that he did not acquire a diligence right by the intermittant use which was indeterminable in quantity. The court
also made it clear that the use n1ade 1nust he for the exclusive benefit of the appropriator:
''In Lake Shore Duck Club v. Lake Yiew Duck
Club et al., 50 Utah at page 82, 166 Pac. at page
311, L. R. A. 1918 B, 620, this court said:
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"'But for the purpose of effecting a
valid appropriation of water under the statutes of this state we are decidedly of the
opinion that the beneficial use contemplated
in n1aking the appropriation 1nust he one that
riator and subject to his complete dominion
and control.' See, also, sections 759 et seq., 2
l{inney on Irrigation."
Under this standard, the United States as a landowner could not possibly clain1 the benefit of any appropriations of water for stockwatering purposes made
by the various cattle and sheep operators who actually
used the water on the government-owned lands. Such
use could only inure to the benefit of the actual appropriators, who were the livestock operators; for such use
·was not subject to or under the dmninion and control of
the government, but on the contrary, such use was independent of any supervision or control whatsoever of the
Federal governn1ent. In fact, the government did not
know who were the livestock operators, and it does not
now know who they were, and could not possibly identify
any of them.
Neither the Federal government nor any other landowner, can lawfully claim diligence rights for stockwatering, when the only beneficial use of water for stockwatering prior to 1903, was initiated and continued exclusively by livestock operators whose operations were
independent of the landowner. The government had no
interest in the livestock which made a consumptive use
of the water, and the government exercised no control

so
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over the livestork operators who appropriated the water
to beneficial use. The belief of some government officials that such beneficial use which was 111ade independent of govern1nent regulation or control, "'enured to the
benefit of the lTnited States,'' fortunately did not change
the existing law. The govern1nent claims of diligenre
rights are based entirely on the fictitious premise that a
landowner could acquire such a right without actually
making an appropriation of water to beneficial use. Such
a daim, if established, 'vould create in the landowner a
duplicate water right, in direct opposition to the fundamental rule that beneficial use shall be the basis, the
measure, and the limit of the right to use water.

Point No. 4
WHERE THE LIVESTOCK OPERATORS WHO ACTUALLY MADE THE BENEFICIAL USE OF THE WATER (OR
THEIR SUCCESSORS IN INTEREST), HAVE ACQUIRED
DILIGENCE RIGHTS TO THE USE OF THE \VATER, THE
LANDOWNER WHO NEVER USED THE WATER AND HAD
NO INTEREST IN SUCH LIVESTOCK CANNOT CLAIM
DILIGENCE. RIGHTS PREDICATED UPON SUCH USE
MADE EXCLUSIVELY BY OTHERS WHEN THERE WAS NO
PRIVITY WHATSOEVER.

The cases which we have previously cited, as well as
the statutes, indicate that private citizens could lawfully
appropriate water to beneficial use on the public domain.
See Sowards v. Meagher, 37 U. 212, 108 P~ 1112. Appellants and other water claimants acquired diligence rights
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based upon actual application of \Yater to beneficial use,
dating back to 1875. Those uses were not in subordination to any claims of the r nited States of America, for
the government made no such claims prior to 1951. The
government had no interest in the livestock which actually watered at the watering places in question on the
government-owned lands. In fact, the government had
nothing whatever to do with the appropriations of water
for stockwatering purposes by the livestock operators.
No claim is made that the Federal government ever
succeeded to the rights of the livestock operators who actually appropriated the water to a beneficial use. rrhe
government has never been in the livestock busine:-;:-;, at
least in the area in question, so that it could not have been
the successor in interest. It has neither acquired livestock nor had the management of any of the livestock
which utilized the water. None of the rights of the lin'stock operators have been acquired hy the United Statet'
through purchase, levy or by eminent domain proceedings. If the government had acquired the ownership of
those rights, the appropriators or their :-;nr(·essors in
intere~t would have necessarily been divested of thosP.
right~. No claim of succession is made. The substance of
the govern1nent claim is that the appropriation of water
h:· the livestock operators to a beneficial use in watPringtheir livestock, "enured to the benefit of the l 'nited
States.'' If the livestock operators them:-;rlvP:-; acquired no
water rights b:· beneficial use, hy reason of failure on
their part to comply with the law, such a failure could
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not have enuretl to the benefit of tlw landowner anyway
when such landowner did none of the ad~ e~~ential to an
appropriation of water. HowPver, if the live~tock operator~ acquired diligence righb, which does not seem to be
disputed, tho~e rights \Yere ye~ted in them, not in the
landowner.
Congre~s has recognized the faet that livestock operators did acquire water rights on the public domain, not
only by the early legislation previously cited, but by
more recent legislation. By the Taylor Grazing Act, 43
U. S. C. A., 315 et seq., it is provided (sec. 315b) :

"* * * Preference shall be given in the issuance of grazing permib-1 to those within or near
a district, who are landowners engaged in the
livestock busines~, bona fide occupants or settlers,
or owners of water rights, as n1ay be necessar)T to
permit the proper use of lands, tcater or water
rights owned, occupied, or leased by them, * * * ."
(Italics added).
In the Federal Range Code, Exhibit ''A", 161.1 (b),
the same rule i~ stated. In fact, by such code, in order to
obtain a· permit, the party must be a citizen (or have declared his intention to become one j and Inust be engaged
in the livestock business. Under its own regulation, the
United States could not qualify to graze any livestock,
since it has never been engaged in the livestock business.
By the F'ederal Range Code, the United States has
recognized the fact that livestock operators have acquired
rights to the use of water whether that water has its ori-
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gin on the public domain or elsewhere.
K o claim is made in the case that there wai5 any
agreement between the stockmen and the government with
respect to the application of water to beneficial use.
r:rhere \vas no privity between the government and the
appropriators of water for stockwatering purposes. The
heneficial use made was that of the livestock operators,
not a use hy the government. The use by the livestock
operators was exclusive, since the United States owned
no livestock and had no control of livestock.
Inasmuch as duplicate water rights or dual water
rights cannot exist in the State of Ftah, the fact that the
livestock operators acquired diligence rights and Iwwr
conveyed the same to the government, precluded the Federal government fr01n acquiring those identical water
rights. The govermnent does not claim that it acquired
any rights fr01n the original appropriators b)~ purchase,
levy, or e1ninent domain.
J£ven if it were assu1ned that the livestock operators
who acquired diligence stockwatering rights h)· appropriation to beneficial use some of the waters arising on
government-own lands, subsequently lost those diligenee
rights hy more than five )-ears of nonuser, such forfeiture on the part of the original appropriators could not
aid the claims of the government. Where a party loses
his right b)- nonuser, that water reverts to the public and
becomes subject to re-appropriation (100-1 --1-, P. C. A.
1943, 7i~-1--t-, e. c. A. 1953). Thus, in no P\'Pllt could the
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<YOvernment benefit from anY• art or failure on the part
of the appropriators.
b

Point No. 5
THE STIPULATION OF FACTS IN THIS CASE SHOWS
CONCLUSIVELY THAT THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NEVER ACQUIRED ANY DILIGENCE RIGHTS TO THE
USE OF WATER, AND THAT THE DILIGENCE RIGHTS
CLAIMS WHICH THE STATE. ENGINEER PROPOSES TO
HAVE INCORPORATED INTO THE DECREE ON BEHALF
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ARE VOID.

The Stipulation of facts clearly above shows that the
Federal govern1nent neither appropriated any water to
beneficial use for stockwatering, nor had any control or
ownership over the livestock which actually used the
water:
"IT IS STIPULATED:
"1. On or about April 2, 1951, the United
States of America filed with the State Engineer
water users' claims nun1bered 1104 to 1115, both
inclusive, which claims are listed as diligence
claims in the Proposed Determination on pages
361 and 362. The diligence claims are based upon
the use of water for stock watering purposes by
livestock operators and others who in the past
have grazed livestock on the public domain. Such
use cmnmenced in 1875 and has continued down
to the present time.
"2. The United States of America has
neither owned nor· operated any of the livestock
~5
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which has watered at the sources of supply or at
any of the watering places listed in either the
claims of diligence rights or in the applications
for appropriation. Any beneficial use of the
waters with which the rnited States or any governmental agency is here concerned is a use made
by livestock exclusively owned and operated hY
interests other than the Fnited States of Amerie~.
"3. No grazing perinits were issued on the
Cache National Forest prior to 1906, and no permits for grazing of livestock on public lands of the
United States outside of the national forest \rere
issued prior to 1935.
"4-. In filing the aforesaid diligence right~
claims on April 2, 1951, the officials of the Fnited
States at whose instance said claims were filed,
did so in the belief that the past use of the water
at the points listed in the claims, by livestock operators, has inured to the benefit of the 1ynited
States of America. In filing the applications to
appropriate water, the government officials at
whose instance such applications were filed, did
so with the purpose of acquiring for the United
States of America, water rights through the use
of water by livestock operators grazing bYr~to<'k
under permits issued by the United States for the
use of forage grown on public lands."
The Stipulation shows conclusively that prior to
1903 when any diligence rights claims would have arisrn,
the l-;- nited States of Ameriea did not even issue a permit
for the use of the forests, and that as to the balance
of the public don1ain, no grazing permits were issued
prior to 1935. The Stipulation J>l'P<'lndc>s an~· possibility
that diligence rights for stockwatering- purpos<>s were
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ever acquired by the Federal Government. 'l'he ~tipula
tion in effect ad1nits the grounds stated in the motion of
appellants 1nade on August :m, 195:2, to strike the diligence
rights clai1ns recapitulated here as follows (R. ~8-29) :
1. The so-called '"diligence rights" and each or the1n
are invalid on the fact of the record, inasmuch as they
were filed on behalf of the Forest Service and they purport to antedate the existence of the F'orest Service.
Even if the Forest Service had been authorized by both
State and Federal statutes to acquire diligence rights for
stockwatering (which appellants deny) it could not acownership of the waters which arise on those lands.
Congress did not atte1npt to reserve to the United States
quire a right before it caine into existence.

2. Neither the Forest Service nor any other agency
of the United States ever operated any livestock in the
area so as to be able to acquire any diligence rights.
3. The claims were not based on any use 1nade by
the rnited States of America, nor by any agent or
agency, but based on use by individual water users with
whom there was no privity, none of said users ever having
acted for or on behalf of the United States.
4. There was no authority of law for acquiring any
diligence rights by the Forest Service, even if there, had
been a Federal statute pennitting such acquisition, for
prior to 1941 our State statutes, 100-3-2, U. C. A. 1943,
did not pennit the appropriation of water by the United
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States except by and through the Bureau of Reclamation,
and by that time it had become impossible to acquire
any diligence rights for approximately 48 years.
The trial court should have granted the appellant's
rnotion to strike each of the so-called diligence el.aims, for
the reason the United States conclusively demonstrated
by its stipulation that it did not do any of the acts essential to the appropriation of water to a beneficial use for
stockwatering, prior to 1903 or at ~y other time. The
gqvernn1ent owned no livestock and it did not operate any
livestock by which a beneficial use of the water could have
been made. No beneficial use was ever made by or under
the control or supervision of the United States. No
agency of the government exercised any dominion over
the stockwatering, and therefore there could not have
been any appropriation of water for beneficial use.
An· appropriation of water still consists of putting
the same to· a beneficial use. See Wellsville East Field
Irrigation Co. v. Lindsay Land & Livestock Co., 104 Utah.
448, 137 P. 2d 634. As indicated in Adams v. Portage Irrigation Co., 95 Utah 1, 72 P. 2d 648, the use of water for
stockwatering purposes is an appropriation of water by
the livestock operators. The only parties who put the
water to beneficial use on the govennnent-owned lands,
were the livestock operators. There was no privity between the livestock owners and the Federal government.
There 'vas no foundation for the claiin that diligenet>
rights were claimed hy virtue of the belief of some government officials that the acts of the livestock operators
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who actually put the water to henefi<-·ial use, "pnured to
the benefit of the Pnited States."
Inasmuch as the government admittt~d faet~ which
showed that ih~ claims of diligence rights were wholly
unfounded, and that the Federal gover1unent neYer made
any appropriation of water for stockwatering purposes,
the appellants \\·ere entitled to a finding that there wa~
no appropriation of water for beneficial use and a conclusion of law to the effect that the diligence clai1ns were null
and Yoid ab initio. The appellants are entitled to a decree adjudging those diligence clain1s to be null and
,·oid, the smne as any other unfotmded clain1s, for the
reason that the proof here was conclusive, by virtue of
the admission of facts in the stipulation on which reasonable minds could not differ.

Point No. 6
PRIOR TO THE 1941 AMENDMENT, EXCEPT .FOR PURPOSES OF THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, THE UNITED
STATES HAD NO AUTHORITY UNDER THE STATE
STATUTES TO FILE ON WATER, AND THERE IS NO
FEDERAL STATUTE WHICH AUTHORIZES THE FOREST
SERVICE OR THE BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT TO
MAKE WATER APPLICATIONS, AND CONSEQUENTLY
SUCH APPLICATIONS WERE AND ARE VOID.

Prior to 1919, the State statute allowed "Any person,
corporation, or association, to hereafter acquire the right
to the use of any public water in the State of Utah.''
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C. L. U. 1917, sec. 3451. In 1919, the statute was amended
to read:
"Any person who is a citizen of the Fnited
States, or was has filed his declaration of intention to become such as required by the naturalization law~, or any association of such citizens or declarants, or any corporation, in order hereafter to
acquire the right to the use of any unappropriated
public water in this state shall, before commencing the construction, enlargement or extension of
any ditch, canal or other distributing works, or
performing si1nilar work tending to acquire such
right or appropriation, make an application in
writing to the State Engineer." f.;ection 100-3-2,
R. S. U. 1933).
By chapter 40, Laws of Utah 1941, Section 100-3-2
was mnended hy inserting after the word "corporation,''
the following:
"or the state of Utah h!' the chairman of the
commission of publicity and industrial development, the fish and game commissioner, the exeeutive secretarY of the state land board or the
chairman of ·the state road commission for the
use and benefit of the public, or the lTnitPd Statl·~
of America."
Except for the Bureau of Reclamation, there wa:-;
no authorit!T granted by law for an)' agency of the United
States to acquire any water rights prior to the 1941
amendment. The Forest Service wa~ i1npotent to claim
any diligence rights, inasmuch as those diligence right~
all allegedly ante-dated the setting up of the 1~-,oret-~t
Service in the Cache National Forest in 1906. An ag-en<'Y
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·<

could not acquire diligence rights before it had any
existence.
Even if the Forest Service had been permitted by
an act of Congress to acquire stockwatering rights, it
would have been compelled to do exactly what any citizen
or prospective citizen would have been required to do.
Prior to July 1, 194i, the United States of Alnerica did
not come "·ithin the orbit of eligible persons are entities,
except in the ca~e of the Bureau of Reclmnation which
was authorized under other statutes. Under no circurnstance could the govern1nent have acquired any diligence
rights for stockwatering, not only for the reason that no
appropriation was made, but likewise because there was
no authority granted under our state laws for such
acquisition until 38 years after the possibility of acquiring diligence rights had ended. Even in the cases where
diligence rights could have been predicated upon use
of underground waters fron1 springs and wells prior
to 1937 where the wateT did not flow in any well-defined
channel, the Forest Service would have been precluded
from any legal authority; and claims of such a character
are not involved here.
Nor do the Federal statutes authorize what has
been attempted here. As late as August 28, 1937, in the
act for Water Conservation, Congress did not authorize
Federal agencies to acquire water rights except for
purposes specifically authorized, 16 U. S. C. A., 590 ( 4) :
" (4) To obtain options upon and to acquire
lands, or rights or interests therein, or rights to
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the use of water, h:~ purchase, lease, gift,
exchange, condemnation, or otherwise, only when
necessary for the purposes of sections 590r-590x
of thi~ title."
The overarching objective of the Reclamation Laws
is to aid private citizens to acquire water rights appurtenant to land which they otherwise would be financially
unable to acquire. None of the Federal legislation manifests any intention to transfer to the Federal government
or any agency thereof, control over the non-navigable
waters of this State or of any other State.
The attempt to assert diligence stockwatering rights,
was obviously void. \Ve contend that with respect to
the applications for appropriations, all filed at least two
years after this proceeding was instituted, there was no
Federal law to authorize the same, even if authorized
b:~ the State law in 1941.

Point No. 7
THE STIPULATION OF FACTS SHOWS THAT EVEN
IF THERE HAD BEEN ANY AUTHORITY OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA TO FILE APPLICATIONS TO
APPROPRIATE WATER IN THIS STATE, SUCH APPLICATIONS IN QUESTION WERE VOID AB INITIO IN VIEW OF
THE FACT THAT THE STIPULATION OF FACTS SHOWS
THAT THERE WAS NO INTENTION ON THE PART OF
THE APPLICANT TO PUT THE WATER TO BENEFICIAL
USE.

Everything which has be€m said previously with
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respect to the clailus of diligence right~, applies with
equal force here, with regard to the alleged a ttPmpt:-;
to initiate water rights for stoekwatering frotn and after
19-U. The stipulation of facb recites:

··-t • • • In filing the applications to appropriate water, the government officials at whose
instance such applications were filed, did so with
the purpose of acquiring for the United States
of America) water rights through the use of water
by livestock operators grazing livestock tmder
permits issued by the United States for the use
of forage grown on public lands."
In the case of diligence claims, the government
claimed the benefit of the acts of the appropriators who
watered their livestock on governn1ent-owned lands, without having permits. In the case of the applications for.
appropriation, the government takes the position that
if a person cmnes upon land under a grazing permit
from the owner, the application of water to bene~icial
use by the permittee inures to the benefit of the landowner. A mere permit to graze, which does not have
the effect of exercising control over the application of
water to beneficial use, cannot make the beneficial use
of \Vater by the .permittees the beneficial use of the
landowner . The acts of appropriation are still the acts
of the livestock operator. As far as the permits are
concerned, the livestock operators could water their
stock on the adjoining privately owned lands. The permits do not vest in the United States any control over
the watering of the livestock.
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The permittees are not in the same category of
lessees of land \Yhich is irrigated by the lessees under
an agree1nent that the lessees shall apply the water upon
the land on behalf of the owner to prove up on the
owner's application to appropriate the water for irrigation.
Furthermore, the stipulation clearly shows a lack
of intention on the part of the United States to apply
the water to beneficial use for stockwatering. The watering of livestock is not a function of the government
under the terms of the permits. The livestock operators
water their livestock where, when and how they deem
appropriate. The watering is under the superYision and
control of the livestock operators.
As hereinabove pointed out, in some cases the State
Engineer issued certificates of appropriation. Those
certificates were only prima facie evidence of appropriation of water by the applicant; and the stipulation
shows that such prima facie evidence is entirely false,
and that no appropriation was ever made by the FnitPd
States of An1erica. The stipulation shows that the
l!nited States did not intend to perform any of the
acts essential to an appropriation of water to beneficial
u:-;e for stockwatering, but to claim the benefit of indefinite and in many cases unknown acts of the pennittees.
\Ve contend that the Honorable Lewis Jones, distriet
judge, should have granted the motion to strike earh of
the claims based upon appropriation, since· then~ obvi\64
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ou~ly was no appropriation and no intention whatsoever
to make any appropriation of water in accordance 'vith
tl1e laws of this State.

Point :No. 8
THE DECLARED PURPOSE IN EACH OF THE APPLICATIONS FILED BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
IS SHOWN TO BE AN ATTEMPT TO PREEMPT THE
WATER, TO GAIN A MONOPOLY AND TO CONTROL
OTHER LANDS OF PRIVATE CITIZENS AND TO "REGULATE" THE PUBLIC GRAZING LANDS, AND SUCH PURPOSES ARE FOR THE DOMINATION OF THE PROPERTY
RIGHTS OF OTHERS AND NOT FOR THE APPLICATION
OF WATER TO BENEFICIAL USE BY THE LANDOWNER
OR APPLICANT.

At the hearing on September 13, 1952, counsel for
the governinent stated for the record "that the whole
purpose of the United States and the agencies actively
making claims to water" in this case is "entirely for the
benefit of permittees and other grantees to graze on the
public lands." (R. 51). Such statement is incorrect, for
as indicated by counsel, the permittees might change,
and the government does not want any permittee "to
obtain pennanent rights in the water." The whole purpose of the applications was to obtain control of the
water and to pree1npt the water from further filing by
the livestock operators. As indicated at the hearing,
each application filed by the government contains. the
following declaration (R. 52) :
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"The purpose of the appropriation is to provide water for livestock using the surrounding
federal range and to conserve and regulate the
public grazing lands to stabilize the livestock
industry dependent on them and in aid thereof
to promote proper use of the privately controlled
lands and water dependent upon the puhlic
grazing lands.
"The quantity of water sought to be appropriated is limited to that which can be beneficiallY
used by the persons herein described."
·
Thus, the only persons who would beneficially use
the water would be the permittees, and the government
does not propose that any water rights shall be acquired
by them, although the permittees will make the appropriation of water for beneficial use. Furthermore, the
declaration shows a design to pre-empt th~ water from
further filing by livestock operators, and to ve~t the
control of the water in the government, although the
governinent itself makes no use of the water. One of
the avowed purposes is "to conserve and regulate the
public grazing lands to stabilize the liTestock ind11sfry
dependent on them and in aid thereof to promote propl'r
usc of the privately controlled la,nds and wnfet· depenrlent
upon the public grazing lands."
No better statement could be made of an intention
to control and monopolize the water by a nonappropriator of \Yater in order to regulate the aetivities of the
appropriators and their husinP~~. Section 100-3-8, V. C.
A. lf)-t-:i, Section 7:~-:3-.'-i, U. C. A. 1953, authorizes approval
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of an application by the State Engineer only if ''the
application was filed in good faith and not for purpo~P~
of speculation or rnonopoly, ·· and other essential facts

exist.
Here, the governrnent proposes to dominate and to
control privately owned property through application~
for appropriation, without any intention to actually
·utilize the water. A new theory of water rights '<\·a.s
manifested in the clain1 of diligence rights whereby the
landowner would acquire duplicate water right~ based
on the appropriations of water for beneficial use rnade
on such land by livestock operators not in privity with
the landowner. K ow we have still another theory that
the landowner can pre-en1pt the water which arises on
his land, without any intention himself to appropriate
the water to beneficial use, but by permitting others to
come upon his land and apply the water to beneficial use.
Furthermore, there is irnplicit in such declaration an
attempt to gain control over privately owned lands and
water rights, which spells out clearly a n1onopolistic
purpose interdicted by our water la-w. The whole purpose is in derrogation of the rule that beneficial use
shall be the basis, the measure and the limit of all rights
to the use of water in this State.
We contend that the applications are void on their
face, as an attempt to circmnvent the law. It is well
known, that when an agen~y of government is invested
with power, it seldom exercises less po~er than it
acquires. To permit the approval of such void applica-
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tions, and to give them judicial status in the general
adjudication decree, is to sanction the declared purposes
which are contrary to law, and which would operate to
circumvent and destroy our entire law of bBneficial use.
\Ve further contend that the trial court should have
adjudged those applications, and each of them, to be void.

Point No. 9
THE STIPULATION SHOWS THAT SOME OF THE
APPLICATIONS LAPSED OR WERE WITHDRAWN, AND
THAT WHERE CERTIFICATES OF APPROPRIATION
WERE ISSUED SUCH PROOF WAS FALSE AND THAT NO
WATER HAS EVER BEEN PUT TO BENEFICIAL USE, SO
THAT THERE ARE NO EXISTING RIGHTS TO THE USE
OF WATER AND NO BENEFICIAL USE OF WATER BEING
MADE UPON WHICH ANY ADJUDICATION CAN BE MADE
IN FAVOR OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

It is true that in the findings of fact, paragraph 1,
there are set out the numbers of applications which
were not withdrawn and which had not formally lapsed;
but by the terms of the interlocutor:- decr<'r, the court
did not li1nit approval to those particular application~,
but dismissed all of the objections. The court did not
even sustain the objections a:;; to the applications whi(·h
the governrnent admitted h~' paragraph 7 of the Rtipulation were withdrawn or had lapsed.
It is clear that as to those applications on whi(·h
certificates were issued, the stipulation shows that there
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,,

has never been any appropriation of water to bPnt~fieial
use bY the o·ovenuuent and those claims should hP
•

b

'

adjudged void. ~-\s to the diligenee right8 elaim~, the~·
likewise were void. ~-\8 to the balance of the applications
which were not withdrawn, the applications manifP~t a
purpose contrary to the laws of this State. The stipulation sho,,·s on its face that the govern1nent is not an
appropriator of water, it has never been and it does
not propose to 1nake any appropriation whatsoever. The
stipulation has the force of conclusive evidence.
Consequently, there are no existing water rights
nor any valid pending applications which could be
adjudicated in favor of the united States of America.
\Ve contend that the record requires a finding that
all of the claims of the L"nited States were and are
invalid. The findings of fact do not cover the admitted
facts at all, and the interlocutory decree erroneously
dismisses the objections of appellants, when the decree
should grant the motion of appellants to strike each and
every one of the claims of the United States from the
Proposed Determination.
Appellants respectfully request this Honorable
Court to reverse the interlocutory decree and order
entry of a decree to the effect that all of the claims of
the United States of America, were and are void, and
also order the elimination of each of said claims from
69
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the Proposed Determination of the State Engineer in
nmking the final decree.
Respectfully submitted,
:McKAY, BURTON,
& RICHARDS,

~lc~liLLAN

PAUL E. REI.MANN, and
MILTON A. O:MAK,

Attorneys for Objectors and
.A[Jpellants.
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